

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 INR-05 CIAE-00

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DODE-00 L-01 /056 W

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P R 060950Z MAY 75

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9967

INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 4036

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MASS, 0(, AF, IR, VN

SUBJ: DISCUSSION WITH PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO

1. NIGHT BEFORE LAST BHUTTO PHONED ME AFTER RETURNING FROM BALUCHISTAN, SAYING HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE ME AS SOON AS HE COULD ARRANGE TO DO SO AS WE HAD NOT HAD A CHAT FOR SOME TIME. HE SAID HE HOPED TO SET IT FOR THE NEXT DAY AND WONDERED IF I WOULD BE AVAILABLE ON SHORT NOTICE. I SAID I MOST CERTAINLY WOULD BE. THE APPOINTMENT WAS LATER SET FOR LAST EVENING.

2. WE HAD A LONG AND INTERESTING CHAT RANGING ALL THE WAY FROM THE PRICE OF WHEAT TO THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. WHILE THE TALK IN GENERAL SERVED A USEFUL PURPOSE OF KEEPING IN TOUCH, IT WAS FOR THE MOST PART DEVOID OF SPECIFICS THAT MAKE INTERESTING REPORTING. ONE PURPOSE BHUTTO OBVIOUSLY HAD IN MIND WAS TO MOLLIFY ME BECAUSE OF REPORTS HE HAD RECEIVED OF MY IRRITATION OVER SLANTED REPORTING AGAINST US
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OVER THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. INCIDENTALLY,

WHILE TALKING OF THE DIFFICULTIES FROM THE POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW IN THE RECENT RAISE IN PRICES OF BASIC COMMODITIES, HE SAID HE WISHED NOW HE HAD FOLLOWED MY ADVICE AND DONE IT LAST YEAR. I SAID I KNEW IT WAS A DIFFICULT MATTER FOR HIM AND VERY MUCH OF AN INTERNAL MATTER. MY MOTIVE IN TALKING TO HIM ON SUCH MATTERS WAS A DESIRE TO SEE PAKISTAN TAKE STEPS THAT WOULD RESULT IN INCREASED PRODUCTION AND LESSEN DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN HELP WITH FOOD GRAINS. HE SAID HE APPRECIATED THIS AND FROM THAT POINT OF VIEW MY ADVICE HAD BEEN SOUND, AND THAT HE WAS SATISFIED THAT HE HAD MADE THE RIGHT MOVE.

3. BHUTTO REFERRED TO MY RECENT CONCERN ABOUT THE PAKISTANI PRESS COVERAGE OF EVENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, SAYING THAT HE REALIZED DISTORTION HAD CREPT INTO THE PRESS TO THE POINT WHERE IT NEEDED ACTION ON THEIR PART TO CORRECT IT. HE SAID HE WAS GLAD I HAD MADE MY VIEWS KNOWN AND HOPED I FOUND THE COVERAGE NOW MORE BALANCED. (IT HAS IN FACT BEEN SO AND I HAD NO CAUSE ON WHICH TO COMPLAIN AFTER THEIR RECENT COORDINATED TALKS WITH THE PRESS WHICH HAVE BEEN REPORTED SEPARATELY).

4. MUCH OF THE TIME THAT FOLLOWED WAS DEVOTED TO A PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSION AS TO WHAT WENT WRONG IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND WHY. THIS WAS LARGELY WITHOUT EITHER CONSENSUS OR CONCLUSION. I FELT BHUTTO, WITH ALL OF HIS INTELLECT AND SOPHISTICATION, WAS GENERALLY ILL INFORMED ABOUT THE DIFFERENCE IN EITHER DEVELOPMENT OR THE DAILY LIFE OF PEOPLE LIVING IN SUCH PLACES AS SOUTH KOREA AND SOUTH VIETNAM COMPARED TO THAT IN THEIR NORTHERN COMMUNIST AREAS. I BELIEVE HE IS STILL MORE INCLINED TO ACCEPT THE THESIS OF "THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE" THAN IS JUSTIFIED. ONE SPECULATES THAT HE HAS ONLY BEEN SUBJECTED TO GUIDED TOURS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND IS TOO INCLINED TO ACCEPT SOME OF THEIR PROPAGANDA AT FACE VALUE. YET, ON THE WHOLE, HE WAS EMINENTLY REASONABLE, HOPING THAT DAMAGE TO THE WORLD POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES COULD BE HELD TO MINIMAL LEVELS,
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AND THAT IN ANY REASSESSMENT WE MIGHT GO THROUGH WE WOULD NOT DIMINISH OUR POSTURE OF WORLD LEADERSHIP WHICH WAS SO DESPERATELY NEEDED.

5. BHUTTO IS PERHAPS MORE INCLINED THAT I TO BELIEVE THAT THE MOMENTUM CREATED SO FAR WILL QUICKLY EXTEND TO INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THAI AND BURMESE INSURGENCY, AND HE QUESTIONED WHETHER THE TIDE IN THE NEXT TEN

YEARS MIGHT SPREAD AS FAR AS BANGLADESH. ALSO, PERHAPS MORE THAN I, HE WONDERED IF THERE MIGHT BE EARLY DEVELOPMENTS RE TAIWAN AND KOREA. ON THE LATTER I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT THE SOUTH KOREANS COULD ADEQUATELY TAKE CARE OF THEMSELVES IN THE ABSENCE OF LARGE SCALE SUPPORT FOR AGGRESSION SUPPLIED BY EITHER CHINA OR RUSSIA, WHICH WOULD OF COURSE PRODUCE ANOTHER SERIOUS CONFRONTATION.

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INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 INR-05 CIAE-00

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9968

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AMEMBASSYKABUL

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 4036

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6. WE TALKED ABOUT THE SALE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, BUT STAFF WORK HERE HAS NOT PROCEEDED TO THE POINT OF ANY CONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION. HE REMAINS CONVINCED OF THE DESIRABILITY OF THE QUIET PROVISION OF US EQUIPMENT THROUGH IRAN, AND I AGAIN CAUTIONED HIM THAT IF WE WERE NOT MOST CAREFUL INDEED, HANDLING THE ACQUISITION OF NEW EQUIPMENT THROUGH IRAN COULD END UP APPEARING TO OUR CONGRESS THAT IRAN WAS BEING USED AS A SUBTERFUGE, AND PERHAPS RAISE MORE DIFFICULTIES THAN DIRECT SUPPLY. HE SAID HE HAD HOPED THE REVERSE WOULD BE TRUE AND THAT WE WOULD FIND QUIET SUPPLY THROUGH A THIRD COUNTRY EASIER FROM OUR OWN POINT OF VIEW. HE MADE THE INTERESTING OBSERVATION THAT ONE OF HIS MOTIVES WAS

TO TRY TO KEEP IRAN SO INVOLVED IN THE ISSUE OF PAK SECURITY THAT THEY WOULD FEEL A PART OF THE EXERCISE TO THE POINT OF FEELING SOME RESPONSIBILITY. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD THIS MOTIVE AS I THOUGHT PAK-IRANIAN RELATIONS A VERY IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE LONG-RANGE SECURITY OF PAKISTAN.

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7. OUR CONVERSATION RE AFGHANISTAN WAS BRIEF, BUT I TOLD HIM OF MY REGRET THAT A FOREIGN AFFAIRS PROBLEM HAD BECOME SO CLOSELY ENMESHED IN A DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEM. I MADE REFERENCE TO THE FACT THAT IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN SO, BUT OBVIOUSLY WAS MORE SO SINCE HE HAD BANNED THE OPPOSITION NAP PARTY. I ASKED WHAT HE COULD SEE AS THE EVENTUAL OUTCOME. BHUTTO REPLIED THAT HE HAD SOME HOPE THAT TALKS BETWEEN PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN COULD COME IN JULY OR AUGUST, BUT HE DID NOT VOLUNTEER ANY REASONING BEHIND SUCH A TIMETABLE. IN THE MEANTIME, HE SAID THE ISSUE OF THE NAP WAS IN THEIR SUPREME COURT, AND HE WAS WORKING HARD TO GET A BETTER AND MORE HONEST GOVERNMENT IN THE FRONTIER PROVINCE.

8. BHUTTO SAID HE HOPED THE SHAH COULD AND WOULD BE HELPFUL ALTHOUGH HE HAD ONE DANGER TO THINK OF IN THAT REGARD. HE SAID THAT IN ANY MEDIATION EFFORT HE WOULD BE PLACED IN AN IMPOSSIBLE DILEMMA IF THE SHAH ON HIS OWN CAME UP WITH SOLUTIONS WHICH HE WOULD FIND POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE. IN THAT CASE THE ALL IMPORTANT QUESTION OF PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH IRAN WOULD BECOME INVOLVED. THIS COULD BE A MOST SERIOUS MATTER AS HE IN NO WAY UNDERESTIMATED THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH IRAN. I VOLUNTEERED THAT I THOUGHT THE NATURAL INSTINCTS OF THE SHAH, CERTAINLY AS REGARDS BALUCHISTAN, WOULD BE SUCH THAT I DOUBTED HE NEED BE WORRIED ON THIS SCORE. HE SAID HE AGREED WITH THAT ANALYSIS AND THIS TEMPERED HIS CONCERN THAT THINGS MIGHT GO WRONG.

9. BHUTTO HAS BEEN ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY INVOLVED IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS SINCE HIS RETURN FROM WASHINGTON, WHICH IN PART I SUPPOSE LED TO A LACK OF SPECIFICS OF INTEREST TO THE DEPARTMENT IN THE ABOVE CHAT. HE SEEMED A LITTLE MORE SUBDUED THAN NORMAL AND PENSIVE IN HIS MANNER. IT SEEMS SOMEWHAT TO FIT HIS LACK OF POLEMICS RE FOREIGN AFFAIRS WE HAVE NOTED ON HIS RECENT EXTENDED TOUR OF BALUCHISTAN, WHERE THE EMPAHSIS SEEMED MORE ON ORGANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT THAN HAS BEEN NORMAL IN THE PAST.
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